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This review essay discusses three recent books on the Green New Deal (GND), written, respectively, by 
Naomi Klein, Jeremy Rifkin, and Kate Aronoff and a few other democratic socialists. It argues that the 
New Deal offers a better model of how to envision the change required for deep carbonization than the 
vision of war mobilization after Pearl Harbor since it emphasizes not only the need for massive 
introduction of green technology but also the importance of broad social change constituting a just 
transition. The essay argues that the GND should be placed in a global context so that the adoption of 
the GND in the Global North would lead to much greater funding of green developments in the less 
industrialized countries of the Global South.   
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Harry van der Linden 
 
Under Discussion: 
Kate Aronoff, Alyssa Battistoni, Daniel Aldana Cohen, and Thea Riofrancos, 
A Planet to Win: Why We Need a Green New Deal. New York: Verso, 2019. 
Pp. 194, $19.95, paperback. ISBN 978-1-78873-831-6 
Naomi Klein, On Fire: The (Burning) Case for a Green New Deal. New York: Simon  





Jeremy Rifkin, The Green New Deal: Why the Fossil Fuel Civilization Will Collapse 
  by 2028, and the Bold Economic Plan to Save Life on Earth.  New York: St.  
  Martin’s Press, 2019. Pp. 290, $27.99, hardcover. ISBN 978-1-250-25320-0 
 
How can we imagine and conceptualize an effective response to the threat of disastrous climate 
change, one that would limit average global temperature increase to 1.5°C, and most definitely to 
2 °C, above pre-industrial levels?  A 2018 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) 
report maintains that an average global temperature increase of 1.5°C would have much less 
severe negative impacts than an increase of 2.0°C (beyond which climate change would 
gradually become catastrophic). The report also argues that this target of 1.5°C requires that 
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions be reduced by 45% by 2030 (as compared to 2010 
levels) and reach net zero by 2050.1  So the question becomes: how can we practically envision 
how the United States (and other high emission countries) might come to adopt a very steep 
reduction in GHG emissions within 10 years and move toward complete decarbonization soon 
thereafter? Two visions have been foregrounded in recent years.  The first one is that we should 
see combatting climate change as similar to waging war, notably, as analogous to the total 
mobilization of American society and industry in the Second World War in its contribution to the 
victory over fascism. The second, more currently prevailing, view is that we should see effective 
climate change mitigation as requiring a Green New Deal (GND) similar to the social and 
economic reconstruction of the New Deal aimed at overcoming the devastations of the economic 
collapse of 1929-33.   
Bill McKibben argues for the war mobilization vision in a 2016 essay. He writes: “We’re 
under attack from climate change…. World War III is well and truly underway. And we are 
losing…. Carbon and methane are seizing physical territory, sowing havoc and panic, racking up 
casualties, and even destabilizing governments…. It’s not that global warming is like a world 
war. It is a world war.” He adds: “The question is, will we fight back? And if we do, can we 
 
1 See, IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C. The limit of 2°C increase in average global temperature 





actually defeat an enemy as powerful and inexorable as the laws of physics?”2 For McKibben, 
we will only win the climate-change world war if the people mobilize as the American people 
did in response to fascism after Pearl Harbor.  That involved a rapid and massive development of 
weapons industries; now we should respond by immediately creating on a massive scale solar 
panels and wind turbines.   
The war analogy has some merit by signaling the great disruption of impending climate 
change and by stressing the urgency of addressing it through massive collective action. However, 
viewing “carbon and methane” as an enemy obscures the anthropogenic and political character 
of climate change and neglects the differences between the psychological and physical impacts 
of military attacks and those of climate change. Indeed, McKibben seems to indirectly 
acknowledge this latter point when he notes that one problem with the war on climate change is 
that there is no Pearl Harbor moment that might mobilize the people to fight in this war. At any 
rate, the more prevalent idea is not to claim explicitly that climate change is like a war, but only 
to argue that we need a war-like mobilization, as in World War II, to prevent catastrophe.3 One 
problem with this approach is that it emphasizes the massive development and introduction of 
green technologies as pivotal to avoiding climate catastrophe and neglects the broader issue of 
how capitalism’s focus on growth, profit maximization, and consumerism undermines effective 
 
2 McKibben, “A World at War.” I draw in this paragraph and the next one from my “Climate 
Change Mitigation and the U.N. Security Council,” 132-33. I discuss here also how war 
contributes to global warming, making McKibben’s notion of war against global warming a bit 
ironic.  
3 Woodworth and Griffin, in Unprecedented Climate Mobilization, model their call for total 
climate change mobilization on the war mobilization against Japan and Germany (26-53) and 
also cite similar calls made in 2016 by Bernie Sanders, Jill Stein, and the Democratic Party 
Platform (39-41). A very recent appeal to the war mobilization model only is to be found in 







climate change mitigation.4 Further, the war mobilization vision ignores the importance of 
ensuring that the transition toward a greener society is just, especially for people of marginalized 
and frontline communities. And this approach is too state-centered in terms of agency and fails to 
acknowledge that nationalism must be left behind. Averting climate catastrophe requires 
international solidarity and cooperation, including broad global support for the funding of green 
technology and adaptation measures in poorer economies. 
So while it is plausible to cite the New Deal as an inspiration for how (American) society 
can and should embrace a deep decarbonization, it seems mistaken for proponents of the GND 
(including some of the authors addressed here) to adopt the war mobilization model as well.5 Let 
me discuss first some merits of the New Deal model, and address later a few weaknesses. Naomi 
Klein suggests a first strength in her Foreword to A Planet to Win: “[T]he original New Deal was 
rife with failings and exclusions. But it remains a useful touchstone for showing how every 
sector of life, from forestry to education to the arts to housing to electrification, can be 
transformed under the umbrella of a single, society-wide mission” (xiii).  In other words, as a 
successful program for a green society, the GND, like the New Deal, must transform all aspects 
of society (industry, jobs, housing, transportation, recreation, etc.), while leaving behind the 
social shortcomings of the New Deal – notably, the exclusion or segregation of marginalized 
 
4 Admittedly, there were changes in consumption for the sake of the war mobilization, but they 
were viewed as temporary and not meant to permanently modify and improve the social order.  
These changes were also promoted as a form of sacrifice and the language of sacrifice seems 
misguided with regard to transformations in consumption patterns necessary for the sake of 
climate change mitigation. 
5 See Aronoff et al., A Planet to Win, 5, 22, 78-80 (where they approvingly cite McKibben’s “A 
World at War”).  Even the Green New Deal resolution (see note 8, below) refers to the 
mobilization in WW II. Klein offers some solid arguments in support of the New Deal as 
inspiration for the GND, but nonetheless suggests in On Fire with regard to the New Deal and 
war mobilization models, and a third model of a Marshall Plan for averting climate disaster, that 
each has strengths and weaknesses and is “useful to study and invoke” (37).  Bernie Sanders also 






groups. Moreover, like the New Deal, the GND inspires collective action through the scope of its 
aims. Klein continues: “[T]he Green New Deal has the capacity to mobilize a truly intersectional 
mass movement behind it – not despite its sweeping ambition, but precisely because of it.” And, 
unlike the war mobilization model, the GND is not inherently exclusionary:  by the logic of its 
aims it calls for green social transformation everywhere.  
In On Fire, Klein covers the GND in her introduction, epilogue, and two essays; the 
volume also includes 14 (modified) previously published articles and public talks from 2010 to 
2018 on numerous political aspects of climate change. The GND essays discuss two other 
features of the New Deal that make it a relevant model. First, just as “left militancy” was pivotal 
in creating the progressive programs of the New Deal, so now the left must continue to push the 
GND in more radical directions (262-64). Second, the art projects of the New Deal, with ten 
thousands of artists involved, depicted both harsh reality and transformative utopian visions; 
likewise the GND, without denying our precarious situation, needs hopeful and action-inspiring 
art in a time of Hollywood favoring depictions of the future as social apocalypse (275-78).6  In A 
Planet to Win,  Aronoff et al. add that the New Deal sets a model for creating more green and 
recreational spaces within our cities, and the Civilian Conservation Corps illustrates how to 
proceed with conservation, ecosystem restoration, and creating access to nature (84-86; 134-35). 
More broadly, Klein thinks that reference to past progressive struggles and events such as the 
New Deal reminds us that “[w]e are part of a long and complex collective story, one in which 
human beings are … a work in progress, capable of deep change” (279).  
The idea of a “Green New Deal” has been articulated in various ways for more than a 
decade: Thomas L. Friedman might be the first one who called for a Green New Deal in a New 
York Times column in 2007; a group of British environmentalists drafted a GND in 2008; soon 
the notion was picked up and given different content by the United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) and the German Green Party, and more recently by the US Green Party (see 
Rifkin, 47-50).7 The GND came to the mainstream in the United States in late 2018 with its 
 
6 Klein offers the short film Message from the Future as an example of inspiring GND art. 
7 See also Pettifor, The Case for the Green New Deal, 1-5.  Pettifor was a member of the British 
GND group and discusses differences between the British proposal and the recent American 





promotion by the Sunrise Movement, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other progressive 
Democratic Party politicians.  Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced 
the GND as a joint resolution into the House and Senate in February 2019; the Senate promptly 
rejected it, and House action has been limited to referrals to (sub) committees.8  
The basic features of the GND articulated in the House resolution are the following: The 
United States, thanks to its advanced technology, can play “a leading role” in the reduction of 
GHG emissions and should do so because it has disproportionately contributed to the total 
amount of GHG in the atmosphere. Thus the United States should exceed the global 
requirements for keeping global warming within 1.5°C and adopt a 10 year mobilization plan 
toward net zero GHG emissions. More specifically, this plan requires that all power demand be 
met through renewable zero-emissions sources, and that industry and manufacturing be 
decarbonized “as much as technologically feasible.” Infrastructure, including power grids, and 
housing must be upgraded to maximize green energy efficiency, and the transportation sector 
must turn to net-zero vehicles, affordable public transit, and high-speed rail.  For the sake of a 
just and feasible transition, but also as goals in their own right, the GND mobilization must 
provide economic security, including the creation of millions of “high-wage jobs,” paid family 
and medical leave, and retirement security; labor rights and protections; healthcare for all; 
housing security; food security, and clean air and water; accessible education and training, 
including higher education; and a pollution-free environment and recreational access to nature. 
The GND should also  work to reduce the impact of climate change on especially vulnerable 
frontline communities, and make the United States “the international leader on climate action,” 
promoting international exchange of green technology and expertise and “help[ing] other 
countries achieve a Green New Deal.” Last, the adoption and elaboration of the GND (for which 
no target date is set) must proceed on basis of consultation and collaboration with many groups 
 
book: The British version emphasized the importance “for society to regain public authority over 
the national and international monetary system” (15). Like Aronoff et al., Pettifor argues for a 
more radical GND than the one introduced in Congress.  
8 See House Resolution 109 (introduced into the Senate as Senate Resolution 59). Nonetheless, 
around 100 representatives and a dozen senators have cosponsored the resolution (as of March, 





in society (academia, business, unions, civil society organizations) and commit to investments 
that provide the public with “appropriate ownership stakes,” benefit marginalized communities 
and family farms, and ensure a “commercial environment free from unfair competition and 
domination by domestic or international monopolies.”  
  Before introducing the GND resolution in Congress, Ocasio-Cortez  had unsuccessfully 
called for a bipartisan Select Committee for a Green New Deal with the authority to develop a 
detailed GND plan (on basis of wide input) and draft legislation by early 2020.9 The strategy 
now is to fight for a Democratic Congress and White House in the 2020 elections and then push 
with the help of a massive green movement for the adoption of the GND. How, when, and by 
whom policy details will be elaborated is not clear. But what is clear is that the fossil fuel 
industry will fight this agenda. According to Rifkin’s The Green New Deal, however, such 
resistance is doomed to failure since market forces will lead to the collapse of the fossil fuel 
industry.   
Rifkin’s book barely addresses the GND as proposed in Congress; instead, he updates his 
idea of the “Third Industrial Revolution” as a green revolution and apparently assumes that this 
covers the main features of the GND. The First Industrial Revolution was centered on coal and 
technologies such as rail and steam-powered printing; the Second Industrial Revolution came 
with cheap oil, internal combustion vehicles, the highway system, centralized electricity 
generation, radio and television.   The Third Industrial Revolution centers on the internet, 
renewable energy, and internet-mediated technology, including autonomous and shared electric 
vehicles,  energy efficient homes monitored by sensors, and an electric grid fed by decentralized 
solar and wind energy production.  Rikfin discusses green developments in the energy 
consumption of the internet (52-55), electricity production (55-73), transportation (74-85), the 
building sector (85-92), and the often neglected agriculture and food sector (95-99). These 
sectors make up a large part of total GHG emissions in the United States, but the decoupling 
from fossil fuel in each of them is either moderately slow (in the case of electricity production) 
 
9 See Ocasio-Cortez, “Draft Text.”  House Democrats created instead a Climate Crisis committee 





or painfully slow (as with transportation).10 Rifkin, however, thinks that soon these green 
developments will greatly accelerate. He predicts that we will see the beginning of the end of the 
“fossil fuel civilization” by 2028, perhaps even several years sooner (102-35; 222).  The 
“creative destructiveness” of the market will bring about this profound transformation: Solar and 
wind are increasingly cheaper than gas and oil, and the price of electricity storage is rapidly 
declining. Thus, the market share of solar and wind will continue to grow – solar and wind 
supplied  6 % of global electricity  in 2017 (111) – and lead to an absolute and accelerating 
decline in the use of fossil fuels no later than by 2028.  Rifkin writes: “Let’s be clear that this 
Great Disruption is occurring, in large part, because the marketplace is speaking” (9). To be sure, 
divestment decisions by global pension funds, cities, universities, and the like, may hasten the 
process, but these decisions are not exclusively moral in character and significantly depend on 
considerations of financial risk and profit (139-65).  And so, “with this disruption, the market is a 
guardian angel looking over humanity” (222).  
 Rifkin’s view about the imminent collapse of the fossil fuel industry assumes that this 
industry cannot successfully obstruct or delay its own demise. Rifkin recognizes the problem of 
huge “stranded assets” as a motivator to keep the fossil fuels burning and notes that quite a few 
countries, including very poor countries, are dependent on fossil fuel revenues (131), but he does 
not explain why flooding the market with cheap oil and gas would not delay the dominance of 
solar and wind. Moreover, oil and gas rich states may make it very costly both politically and 
economically for their own societies to transition to renewables. It may also be noted that oil 
companies seek to extend their dominance by promoting carbon capture and sequestration 
(including injecting CO2 in aging oilfields),11 and economic growth may continue to absorb 
much of the potential GHG emission reduction of renewables.  In short, Rifkin’s trust in the 
market is misguided, and radical action that goes beyond small steps like ending fuel subsidies 
and imposing a modest carbon tax seems necessary. The GND resolution is silent with regard to 
any measures against fossil fuel companies, but Aronoff et al. argue that it may indeed be 
 
10 Transportation produces 29% of American GHG emissions, electricity 28%, the building 
sector 12%, and agriculture 9% (figures for 2017).  Industry produces the final 22% of the 
emissions. See EPA, “Sources.”  





necessary to bring these companies under public ownership (by buying the majority of their 
shares) and then rapidly diminish their output (54-55).12 This would also facilitate the planning 
of green employment for “stranded” fossil fuel workers.  Additionally, we should consider 
prosecuting fossil fuel executives for crimes against humanity (60-63).   
 Rifkin fails to discuss the industrial sector and its GHG emissions, as if it were not 
necessary to produce solar panels, wind turbines, efficient home appliances, green buildings 
materials, electric cars, storage batteries, etc. The direct emissions of the industrial sector counts 
for 22% of the GHG in the United States, including fossil fuel burning and emissions released by 
chemical reactions; indirect emissions through the use of electric power add about 7%.  
Extractions of materials for green technology involve GHG emissions and other environmental 
damage. Aronoff et al. discuss in some detail the environmental and social repercussions of 
lithium mining in Chile, including water pollution, huge water use (since lithium is found in 
brine underneath salt flats), diminished biodiversity, and violated  Indigenous territorial rights 
(146-53). Similar concerns apply to other rare earth metals used in batteries, solar panels, and 
wind turbines. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo is the largest supplier of cobalt 
(a key component of electric car batteries) and its mines use child labor on a large scale. The 
challenge is how to avoid in the greening of American society what has been called “eco-
coloniality” or the “deepening [of] extractivism in the name of preventing climate change” (151).  
Some suggestions for how to “decolonize renewable energy” are improved extraction 
 
12 How to enforce reduced use of fossil fuel is a central topic of Cox, The Green New Deal and 
Beyond. This book offers a valuable contribution to the radical analysis of the GND, but it 
appeared after the completion of this review essay. Cox argues that we should pursue “an annual 
mandatory reduction in the supply of each fuel” so that “[i]f the target is, say, to emancipate 
ourselves from fossil fuels within twenty years, then oil, natural gas, and coal extraction will 
each have to be reduced by 5 percent of the amount that was extracted in the year before the 
reduction begins" (97). On his account, such a schema would require a nationalization of fossil 
fuel industries (101), a transitioning toward a low energy economy (84), rationing of electricity 
use (103), and reduced consumption of the top one-third income earners (109). As later will 
become clear, I share Cox’s general view that the GND offers an implausible picture of how 





technology, strengthening local autonomy (at extraction sites) through international solidarity 
networks, and reducing demand through improved recycling, repairing things (rather than 
throwing them away), and reducing consumption (153-63).  Aronoff et al. add that the resources 
for building a decarbonized world must be shared and, therefore, “we should be flexible about 
how much clean energy infrastructure we ultimately build here in the United States. We’re not 
the only ones making the decisions” (159). 
 Should we not also be flexible about how fast we try to move toward 100% renewable 
energy production and net zero emissions?  Whether it is technologically feasible to reach these 
goals within 10 years (without drastic reductions and interruptions in consumption and economic 
activity), as the GND resolution demands, is contested, especially if one would exclude nuclear 
power and carbon capture technology. The GND resolution is silent on these exclusions, while 
Aronoff et al. want to keep safe existing nuclear power plants and are skeptical about industrial 
carbon capture (28).  But aside from technological feasibility, we must ask if the ten-year 
framework is in fact economically, socially, and environmentally defensible.   Both Klein (285-
86) and Aronoff et al. (19) argue that asserting the short timeframe is needed to prevent 
procrastination and to avoid the risks of serious delay, but they do not address the costs of a very 
rapid transition.  The short timeframe increases the danger of maintaining “eco-coloniality” and 
leaves us with the environmental and economic costs of having to dispose of countless still 
functional fossil-fuel cars (only 2% of currently newly purchased cars are electric and the 
average lifespan of combustion engine cars is at least 13 years) and fossil-fuel home appliances, 
including heating and cooling.  Similar concerns can be raised with regard to commercial trucks 
and heating and cooling in commercial buildings. Rapid and large-scale new construction might 
come with significant GHG emissions caused by the production of cement, the scope of which 
will depend on how soon the production will move toward becoming carbon neutral.13 Also, the 
 
13 Currently cement production causes as much as 8% of global CO2 emissions. Aronoff et al. 
provide no timeline, but they think that present production can quickly become carbon neutral 
and next switch to carbon-absorbing concrete (122-23). A more somber assessment is offered by 
the Transition Cement Initiative, a collaboration of European research institutes dedicated to 
decarbonizing cement. It is noted on their home page that GHG emissions in the industry have 





GND seems to demand participatory planning and impact studies of infrastructure changes, such 
as the introduction of extensive public transit and high-speed rail, and these processes might 
need to be cut short under the GND mobilization plan.  
Accordingly, the GND would be stronger if it would adhere to the two following 
guidelines.  First, more emphasis should be placed on the proposal of Aronoff et al. to raise taxes 
on wealth, inheritance, and high incomes so as to reduce luxury spending: not surprisingly, the 
wealthiest households have by far the largest carbon footprints (25; see also Klein, 265).  Thus 
GHG emissions can be reduced without incurring all the various costs of rapidly building a green 
economy. The New Deal aimed at economic growth, while the GND should (but does not) 
explicitly reject this focus. Relatedly, the GND proposes many new jobs with very low or zero 
carbon footprints, such as in healthcare, childcare, and education, and their implementation 
should not be delayed but possibly be foregrounded.  Second, extending the GND timeframe can 
be justified on environmental, economic, and social grounds provided that  this would not slow 
down – or even would lead to more rapid  – decarbonization consistent with the 1.5°C limit in a 
global perspective.14 This condition can be met by sharply increasing the funding of green 
 
efforts to develop breakthrough technologies must be intensified significantly.” See Cement 
Transition Industry, homepage. 
14 Sanders’s GND proposal somewhat accords with this guideline. His GND argues for 100% 
renewable energy by 2030 but delays full decarbonization until 2050, leaving the United States 
with a 71% reduction in GHG emissions in 2030 (as compared to 2017 levels) rather than with 
full decarbonization as demanded by the GND resolution. To offset this, Sanders’s GND 
commits $ 200 billion toward the Green Climate Fund (established by the UNFCCC) to assist 
less industrialized countries of the Global South to reduce emissions by 36% in 2030.  See 
Sanders, “The Green New Deal.” This proposal is on the right track, but from a global 
perspective of seeking decarbonization it seems better, for example, to lower Sanders’s proposal 
of $681 billion in grants for low or moderate income families and small businesses to get their 
old cars off the road (trade them in for American-made electric vehicles) and shift considerably 
more funds to the Green Climate Fund. What American policy would be optimal overall in 
reducing global emissions should ultimately be a matter of globally negotiated targets and 





developments in less industrialized countries of the Global South; these can often bypass rather 
than replace fossil-fuel based investments.  Such developments might also be realizable on a 
smaller scale and so have the added benefit of comparatively lower GHG emissions in their 
production. To be sure, both Aronoff et al. (163) and the GND resolution also support funding 
climate change mitigation in the Global South, but my argument is that this should receive more 
emphasis in light of the costs of very rapidly discarding all assets with a considerable GHG 
footprint.  This is not to deny that the United States and other high industrial countries have a 
special responsibility to address climate change in light of their disproportionate cumulative 
GHG emissions, leaving less room for future emissions by countries from the Global South. But 
one way of discharging this responsibility is to greatly increase the funding of green 
developments in the Global South.  The duty can be further discharged by assisting the Global 
South in its climate change adaptation measures. 
 Rifkin holds that the GND can be realized within a “new social capitalism” (166). This 
involves “socially responsible investing” by private companies, federal and local government, 
and private and public pension funds.  “Flipping Marx,” Rifkin argues that the tens of millions of 
participants in pension funds in the United States form “an army of little capitalists” with the 
potential to bring about the infrastructure of the Third Industrial Revolution (140-42). It will be a 
somewhat decentralized capitalism since Rifkin envisions millions of individuals and small 
businesses owning their own solar panels, wind turbines, and batteries that feed into the grid 
(181).  This decentralization is another important way in which the New Deal and the GND 
differ (181; see also Klein, 39).  The grid itself, and more broadly the digital infrastructure, will 
be publicly owned and controlled but be managed by private companies that can make profits as 
long as they meet performance standards (196-205).  Rifkin is concerned with the dangers of 
“surveillance capitalism,” and thinks that this type of corporate-public partnership will avoid 
these dangers in the development of digitized homes, transportation, and cities (41).15   
 
15 Rifkin seems to have held in his earlier work that the Third Industrial Revolution partly or 
even fully would leave behind capitalism. See Mann, “Toward A Postcapitalist Energy 
Commons and Beyond,” 637-41.  She argues that Rifkin is guided by an “uncritical optimism” 
about how new forms of technology might lead to non-capitalist relations, neglecting the crucial 





The GND resolution quite generally demands that the green economy move toward more 
shared benefits and ownership, and Rifkin’s “social capitalism” seems compatible with the GND 
in this regard. Aronoff et al. are more critical of the idea that a true green economy can be 
realized within capitalism. On their account, the two are in the final instance irreconcilable, but 
since the climate crisis must be addressed sooner than it will take to overthrow capitalism and 
realize socialism, we should try to make the GND as radical as possible (5).16 Crucially, they 
maintain that “[a]n effective Green New Deal is also a radical Green New Deal” (18).  It is a 
GND that aims to motivate the 99 percent and to make the fundamental changes needed to avert 
climate catastrophe (18).  The radical GND goes beyond the GND resolution in its policy details 
and proposes more far-reaching institutional change. We have already seen that the radical GND 
plans to cut off fossil fuel at the supply side (and not just at the demand side by such measures as 
a carbon tax and ending subsidies) by nationalizing the fossil fuel industry and then rapidly 
curtailing its production.  And we have noted that the radical GND also places more emphasis on 
the international aspects of creating a carbon neutral economy.  Aronoff et al. argue further that 
we should move toward a “public national grid,” opposing “solar separatism” of the affluent and 
“geographically lucky” (108).  Lastly, a radical GND will shorten the workweek with the benefit 
of a reduced carbon footprint (89-90) and aims generally for less consumption and reduced 
economic growth once the green revolution has been executed. These are steps that require 
moving beyond capitalism (30).  
In addition to the fossil-fuel industry, the military presents a serious obstacle to the 
implementation of the GND, but this problem is only marginally addressed in Klein (35) and 
 
fossil-fuel industry is uncritical in a similar fashion. Mann also discusses Rifkin’s view that new 
technologies will hugely reduce production costs in society. Perhaps this explains his failure to 
discuss the GHG emissions of the industrial sector.  
16 A Planet to Win is promoted by the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), and its authors 
have published on the climate crisis in left magazines such as In These Times, Jacobin, Dissent, 
and The Nation. Klein also argues in On Fire that capitalism and the green economy are 
incompatible (see, for example, the essay “Capitalism versus the Climate”), but she does not 
discuss here the GND from this angle. Neither Klein nor Aronoff et al. explain in any detail how 





Aronoff et al. (29). In fact the military is a great consumer of fossil fuels. Further, the military 
budget comprises more than 50% of discretionary federal spending, exhausting funds needed for 
the GND.  Militarized research and development similarly crowds out green research and 
development. The military’s history of resource interventions suggests another obstacle to a 
radical GND focused on international solidarity and resource autonomy.17  Add to these 
obstacles the impact of right-wing denialism, the rise of eco-fascism [discussed by Klein (40-
49)], and the preference of many Democratic politicians for weak green proposals [rejected by 
Aronoff et al. as a faux GND (16-17)], and it becomes clear that the political challenges facing 
implementation of the GND are enormous.18  Aronoff et al. recognize the importance of building 
broad coalitions for the GND, stress the importance of union support (92-100), and discuss the 
need for climate strikes (175). But they also appeal to a facile left populism, suggesting that the 
people will come to recognize that the GND is in the interest of everyone but a very small group 
of powerful and rich people (18, 183).  While they plausibly argue that politics as usual in the 
Global North will lead to eco-apartheid with border walls favored above green investments and 
 
17 In All Hell Breaking Loose, Michael Klare discusses how the American military is preparing 
for climate conflict, seeks to reduce its carbon footprint, and takes adaptation measures to 
maintain its operationality. Surprisingly, he does not address how this “greening” of the military 
still leaves the institution as mostly an obstacle to effective climate change mitigation.  
18 This essay was written during the first month of the coronavirus lockdown in California and 
finalized during the first steps of its phasing-out. The long-term impact of this crisis on the 
political future of the GND is hard to asses since the health crisis itself is in flux. The huge 
stimulus and relief programs adopted by Congress may crowd out future financial support for the 
GND. Congress ignored green demands, including a proposal to rebuild the economy more along 
the lines of the GND rather than seeking a recovery of our fossil fuel economy. See “Green 
Stimulus: An Open Letter to Congress.” Thea Riofrancos, coauthor of A Planet to Win, was one 
of the 11 authors of the letter.  Finally, the coronavirus pandemic shows how unprepared 
American society is for future climate disasters, but on a more encouraging note the pandemic 
may have some “climate friendly” impacts, such as an increase in remote work, a reduced work 
week, and greater recognition of the importance of public institutions and investments for human 





the exclusion of millions of climate refugees (180-83), they oversimplify our possible futures and 
the struggle for climate justice by paraphrasing Karl Marx’s famous claim about the proletariat:  
“The future is coming at us fast -- we still have the chance to shape it. We have nothing to lose, 
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